

## **No Night Flights**

## NNF<sub>16</sub>

# Responses to the ExA's Second Written Questions for Deadline 6

Responses due by **Deadline 6**: 3 May 2019

# Application by RiverOak Strategic Partners to upgrade and reopen Manston Airport The Examining Authority's second written questions and requests for information (ExQ2)

#### **Issued on 5 April 2019**

CA.2.33	The Applicant All Parties	Compelling Case in the Public Interest  Section 122 of Planning Act 2008 requires that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that there is a compelling case in the public interest for the Compulsory Acquisition.  The Applicant and all parties are reminded that the ExA considers that responses to other questions and submissions to, and arising from, Issue Specific Hearings, particularly those on need and on socio-economic issues are pertinent to this statutory requirement.
HE.2	Historic environme	ent
HE.2.2	The Applicant	Noise and heritage assets  The ES Vol 1, Chapter 9 [APP-033], 9.6.21 states that the assessment considered the effect of noise on heritage assets in line with Historic England's Aviation Noise Metric Study.  i. Provide a copy of the Aviation Noise Metric Study.  ii. Provide further information with regards to the 'scoping out' of heritage assets within Ramsgate.  iii. Confirm (or otherwise) that the assessment using the Noise Metric Study was applied using the current situation, i.e. a baseline assessment was done assuming no aviation noise for comparison with the 'with aviation' scenario.  NNF has commented on this in NNF01 section C and in NNF14 and NNF09

Nd.2	Need	
ND.2.1	The Applicant	Forecasts
		While accepting that there may be no standard methodology for forecasting air freight, in the Need and Operations Hearing (21/03/19) it was accepted that the Azimuth report [APP-085] did not account for viability and that the forecasts contained within the ES were indicative.
		Given the above, are the Azimuth forecasts effectively therefore an assessment of potential, or a wish list?
		No Night Flights (NNF) submitted for D3 three critiques of Dr Dixon's Azimuth forecasts – NNF06, NNF07 and NNF08. Each of these documents is fact-based and highlights significant flaws in Dr Dixon's work and in her overall approach to this work. We note that RSP has chosen not to comment on any of these critiques.
		NNF then submitted a further critique to D4 – NNF13. We also submitted our responses to the ExA's First Written Questions.
		In addition, NNF submitted to D3 its previous factual review of the UK air cargo sector, "No Room for late Arrivals" (NNF02).
		It is NNF's consistent case that the Azimuth forecasts are, like the Wiggins airport acquisition strategy developed by Dr Dixon and Mr Freudmann, "merely vapour".
		In replies to the ExA, Dr Dixon made it clear that:
		<ul> <li>She did not consider the issue of viability in her reports</li> <li>Her reports were not a business plan</li> <li>She looked at existing air freight volumes for markets such as perishables and then guessed a percentage of that trade that might be displaced to a new airport at Manston</li> <li>The new markets she was considering were those served by ecommerce airlines</li> <li>Some of the business she was forecasting for Manston would be coming from existing UK air freight flows as some markets, in her view, were not being served efficiently</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>That her estimate of the percentage of movement of air freight via trucks that might be displaced to dedicated freighters into Manston was based on looking at one day's traffic for trucks with airline codes moving between LHRW and an EU airport</li> <li>Her "forecasts" were not built around market research with existing airlines. Instead her forecasts reflected her view of markets at a macro level and her view as to where there might be opportunities</li> <li>There was nothing before the ExA that demonstrated that what she said in her reports would happen in terms of ATM numbers would actually be viable</li> </ul>

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She had assumed in her work that the future airport operator would "adopt the right level of pricing".
 Dr Dixon said that she had very limited experience in air freight forecasting in South East England.

Chris Cain said that RSP was trying to understand new markets and that it was not yet known how the "new integrators" would operate across the UK. He said that "noone in the industry is arguing that these guys are coming". Phil Rose for NNF submitted a critique of the most recent Northpoint report for D5.

Given Dr Dixon's lack of air freight forecasting experience; the lack of any evidence that there is "pent up demand" in the UK dedicated air freight market; the lack of any evidence that the market would switch to Manston; and her failure to take pricing into account when forecasting demand, it is clear that the ExA can place no reliance on her conclusions. Her work is indeed a "wish list".

Dr Dixon was not rescued by Mr Cain's interjections at the hearing in March. Mr Cain submitted a paucity of evidence to support his broad assertions. He made it clear that he was talking predominantly about a future market, a market whose future shape in the UK was not yet known.

The Northpoint report repeats the mistakes made in the Azimuth reports. In particular, the core model in the Northpoint report doesn't examine ATMs; it doesn't examine the dedicated freight market in isolation - instead lumping together bellyhold, express and dedicated freight; and it doesn't examine price.

The Azimuth reports and the late addition of the Northpoint report in no way make a compelling case in the public interest for the CPO of SHP's land.

#### ND.2.9 The Applicant

#### **Forecasts**

The chart set above paragraph 8 in the Northpoint report [REP4-031] appears to show a levelling out in 2017.

Is this more symptomatic of the overall period since 2000 as opposed to a longer trend from 2014 going upwards?

The chart referred to in the Northpoint report is in tonnage and not dedicated freight ATMs. The Northpoint report misses the point altogether – dedicated freight ATMs have halved in the UK in recent years. The DCO is about dedicated freight ATMs, not about freight tonnage.

NNF has produced substantial evidence to the Examination of the trends in UK air freight since the turn of the century. This can be found in brief at paras 153-168 and 240-243 in NNF02. The graph at para 182 shows freighter ATMs 1990-2011.

A fuller and more up-to-date setting out of this evidence is in

		NNF06 – NNF's detailed critique of the first volume of Dr Dixon's Azimuth reports.  It is clear from the evidence we have submitted that, as the DfT said in its 2017 UK Aviation Forecasts "At the airport level the number of freighter movements has been volatile with some evidence of overall national decline in recent decades." The current number of UK dedicated freight ATMs is less than half what it was in 2000. The longer term trend is clearly down, with fewer UK dedicated freight ATMs and a smaller % of UK air freight carried in dedicated ATMs.
ND.2.11	The Applicant	Forecasts  At the Need and Operations Hearing (21/03/19) it was stated that the forecasts contained within the Azimuth report [APP-085] were indicative.  i. Provide more information on such forecasts and their indicative nature.  ii. If indicative, what is rationale of using named carriers in developing the forecasts?  iii. How certain are you that the indicative volumes and aircraft types would be likely to fulfil such forecasts?  iv. Do the forecasts provide a realistic indication in your view; have the forecasts been subject to sensitivity testing/analysis?
		Dr Dixon said that the "indicative" airlines used in the ES were there simply to provide a "reasonable assumption" for the ES. A "reasonable assumption" is clearly a long way away from being an evidence-based forecast. We will return to this below.
		Dr Dixon said that her forecasts were based on her assessment of macro market opportunities. She then "guessed" at the % volume of those opportunities that might translate into freight tonnage that could be handled through Manston. She then used the "indicative" airlines that shaped the environmental impact assessment in the ES to arrive at a view of average tonnage per ATM and thus to arrive at her ATM numbers.
		It is clear from Dr Dixon's responses that her forecasts are a guess, based upon a guess, based upon a guess, based upon desk research as to possible sources of demand for air freight. Dr Dixon did not claim that these guesstimates were backed up by clear indications of interest from relevant cargo operators saying that they are ready to use Manston.  NNF has provided a detailed critique of the evidence base (such as it is) and forecasts set out in Dr Dixon's Azimuth II and III in NNF07 and NNF08. We identify worrying issues with her methodology; the unrepresentative interviewee base; her reliance on global rather than UK trends and her apparent

		search for different sources to support her preferred estimate of future market growth. We summarise some of these issues in NNF13.
		The ExA has made it clear that, in all its considerations, it must bear in mind the overarching need for RSP to make a compelling case in the public interest for its proposal. To do that, RSP needs to persuade the ExA that there is indeed a need for a new dedicated cargo airport at the toe of England and that RSP's plans for such an airport are viable. The four Azimuth reports entirely fail to make the case for such an airport and their author does not pretend that she has assessed the proposal's viability.
ND.2.12	The Applicant	Forecasts - Integrator
		At the Need and Operations Hearing (21/03/19) it was stated that the integrator indicated in the forecasts would be a new integrator, as opposed to attracting an existing integrator from an existing airport. Mention was made of Amazon Air and Alibaba.
		The ExA notes the evidence in this regard of York Aviation on behalf of Stone Hill Park Ltd, who state that Amazon has an embryonic operation in the UK with a leased Boeing 737 freighter operating to East Midlands Airport and is opening a 500,000 sq.ft. warehouse and sorting centre adjacent to this Airport, and that Alibaba has committed to establishing its main European hub at Liege Airport [Written Summary of Stone Hill Park Ltd's Oral Submissions put at the Need and Operations Issue Specific Hearing Held on 21 March 2019, submitted at DL5 reference not yet assigned].
		<ol> <li>Outline any discussions you have had with new integrators and quantify the likelihood of such operators coming to the Airport in the second year of operation, with reference to their expansion or growth in similar markets to the UK.</li> </ol>
		ii. Would such integrators not be predisposed to a more centrally located airport where the whole of England could be reached more easily?
		Given Mr Cain's clear evidence at the ISH – Need that the "new integrator" market is a future market, a market whose future shape in the UK is not yet known, and that "no-one in the industry is arguing that these guys are coming", NNF awaits RSP's answer to these questions with interest.
ND.2.13	The Applicant	Forecasts - Integrator
		At the Need and Operations Hearing (21/03/19) it was stated that the new integrator would be different to old integrators and would not be reliant on night time flights. In this regard the ExA notes the evidence provided by Altitude Aviation [Written summary of Stone Hill Park Ltd's oral submissions put at the need and operations Issue Specific Hearing held on

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21 March 2019, submitted at DL5, reference not yet assigned] which provides a table which lists all flights for the first three Amazon Air aircraft registrations (as listed alphabetically) for the week 15-21 March 2019 in the USA. This table shows a large number of night flights.

- i. How would such an integrator dovetail with the proposed night flight ban at Manston?
- ii. Provide examples of existing flight schedules from new integrators where they exist to demonstrate likely flight times (in terms of times of day).

RSP sought to make much of this "new" market and yet has provided little or no evidence about it. RSP has produced no evidence that new integrators would commit to using a daytime airport at Manston that has a ban on scheduled night flights.

In addition, RSP has not tackled the extent to which this "new" integrator market is simply displacement from current integrators to new integrators like Amazon and Alibaba. For years Amazon has used FedEx, DHL and UPS to help Amazon get goods ordered from its website to the customer. A percentage of those flights will now be handled by Amazon's own freighter fleet. This is very much a change in who handles part of a logistics chain rather than the creation of an entire new market. Interestingly, in response to Amazon's new cargo fleet, FedEx Corp. is introducing a new late-night shipping option for retailers who want to speedily send orders directly to online customers. FedEx Corp. says that about 50% of online orders are placed after 4pm. FedEx will collect as late as 2am. It is clear that night flights are still an integral part of the FedEx delivery chain.

#### ND.2.15 The Applicant

#### **Forecasts**

Various evidence [including but not limited to APP-085, REP3-195] refers to freight forecasts provided by Boeing and Airbus.

- i. What is the purpose of such forecasts why do Boeing and Airbus produce such forecasts?
- ii. Have they been historically correct?
- iii. Boeing predict highest Europe rises in freight between the continent and South America and East/South Asia. Would such markets be best suited by bellyhold from hub airports to by pure freighters?
- iv. Do the reports state or infer that pure freight is increasing at the same rate or higher than bellyhold?

NNF has consistently criticised Dr Dixon for relying in her Azimuth reports on global forecasts made by aircraft manufacturers as her source of information about future

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market demand in the UK. NNF set out detailed evidence on this subject in NNF06 at page 44 to 45 and NNF08 at paras 54 to 63. As we demonstrate in NNF06, these forecasts have not reflected what has happened in the UK market. The UK dedicated cargo market has not seen, as Dr Dixon reports that Boeing is saying, "an air cargo market recovery that began in 2014". In 2014, CAA data records 56,356 dedicated cargo ATMs in the UK. In 2017 that figure fell to 52,330 dedicated cargo ATMs, a fall of 7%. This is not a recovery. This demonstrates clearly that the Boeing assessment of what has happened in the global market since 2014 is not an accurate reflection of what happened in the UK market since 2014.

Furthermore, Boeing said in its 2016-2017 World Air Cargo Forecast that:

"World air cargo traffic has averaged 5.0 percent growth per year since 1985". In fact, cargo traffic in the UK has remained flat since 2000.

NNF has set out similar criticisms of the Airbus forecasts. Put simply, global forecasts in tonnage or freight tonne kilometres cannot be taken as a proxy for the number of dedicated freight ATMs that can be expected in the UK market.

#### ND.2.34 The Applicant

#### **Business model**

The Applicant's "Written Summary of Case put Orally – Need and Operation Hearing" [submitted at DL5, ref not yet assigned] document provides a commentary note on the summary business model. It states that a cargo operation at Manston will be accessing demand that is either diverted elsewhere or not functioning due to the severe capacity constraints in the South East of England. This, it is stated, "exists at a general non-specific level and an idiosyncratic level pertinent to Manston itself" and that consequently Manston as a cargo operation will be, "within reason, a price-setter rather than a taker"

- i. In an aviation and geographical context, what characteristics are peculiar to Manston over other UK airports?
- ii. Define 'idiosyncratic' in this context
- iii. In the event of such 'severe capacity constraints', why would demand not overspill to other UK airports outside of the South East, such as East Midlands, Birmingham or Doncaster Finningley?
- iv. Given this, and the availability of road freight, how much of a 'price setter' could Manston be?

RSP ignores the reality that, when Manston Airport was first placed in the hands of Mr Freudmann (whilst he was MD at Wiggins) the UK air freight market handled twice as many dedicated cargo ATMs as it handles today. In a market twice the size of today's, Mr Freudmann and his team failed to

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persuade enough cargo operators that they should fly dedicated cargo in/out of Manston. It is RSP's case that the dedicated freight capacity constraints that it says it has identified in the South East of England existed during the period that Manston was open. Despite this, only an average of 511 cargo ATMs a year used Manston. RSP has produced no evidence to suggest that the much smaller and more competitive market today would commit to using Manston in a way that it did not in the past.

RSP likes to suggest that this past failure was because Wiggins and then Infratil did not invest enough in the airport. However, Mr Freudmann and his team at the time announced that the airport would handle 200,000-250,000 tonnes of cargo on the back of the investments in infrastructure made by Wiggins. Given this infrastructure capacity, at an average of just one to two cargo ATMs a day, the airport was clearly never close to operating at its built capacity.

NNF looks forward to seeing evidence that supports the view that cargo operators would pay a premium to operate out of Manston (we assume this is what RSP means by "price setter") and/or detailed evidence that a development that RSP says will cost over £306m could operate viably by charging prices in line with the current UK air freight market.

The UK's biggest airport for dedicated cargo, East Midlands, reported revenue in 2014-15 of £59.4m. It also reported 4.6m passengers that year with revenue per passenger of £12.10. This suggests that the airport's revenue from passengers was just under £55.7m (4.6m pax at £12.10 each). If that is the case then just £3.74m of that year's revenue came from freight and/or other services. East Midlands handled almost 300,000 tonnes of freight and around 22,000 cargo ATMs to earn that revenue of less than £4m.

Previously, without the additional debt-servicing costs implicit in RSP's plans, Manston cost several million a year to run when it handled around 500 cargo ATMs. It is our view that, without substantial passenger income, a dedicated cargo airport at Manston will simply never make enough money to cover its costs.

Ns.2	Noise and vibration	
Ns.2.3	The Applicant	Air Traffic Movements
		The revision of the Noise Mitigation Plan submitted at D5 [REP5-index number to be allocated] states:
		"1.7 The airport will be subject to an annual quota during between the Night Time Period hours of 2300 and 0700 of <b>3028</b> <sup>1</sup> . Each landing and take-off at the airport during the Night Time Period that time period is to count towards this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ExA emphasis

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annual quota. An aircraft is deemed to have taken off or landed during the time period if the time recorded by the appropriate ATC control unit as 'airborne' or 'landed' respectively falls within it;

At p.80 of the updated Register of Environmental Actions and Commitments (tracked changes), RSP says that "The airport will be subject to an annual quota during the Night Time Period of 3028. **East** take-off or landing at the airport during the Night Time period is to count towards this annual quota." [emphasis added]

Please could the ExA ask the Applicant to confirm whether this is a typo and whether "east" should read "each"?

- 1.8 Emergency flights and flights operated by relief organisations for humanitarian reasons will not count towards the quota set in paragraph 1.7, or the cap set in paragraph 1.9, and will not be subject to the restrictions in paragraph 1.4.
- 1.9 The airport will be subject to a total annual air transport movement limit of **26,468**.
- 1.10 The airport will be subject to a total annual General Aviation movement limit of **38,000**."

ES Chapter 12 states [APP-034]:

"Aircraft Noise (aircraft air and airside ground noise including mobile and static sources of noise)

- 12.7.38 The assessment of aircraft noise is presented for both Year 2 and Year 20 using the forecast aircraft movements as shown in Appendix 3.3. Year 2 is considered the 'opening year' and Year 20 is considered the 'worst-case' year in terms of noise.
- 12.7.39 The forecast assumes that total aircraft traffic will grow from approximately 33 Air Transport Movements8 (ATMs) for a typical busy day in Year 2 to **79 ATMs per typical busy 24-hour day²** in Year 20. There will also be an average of approximately **16 non-ATMs per 24-hour day in all years including general aviation** and training flights.
- 12.7.40 During the daytime period (between 07:00 to 23:00) the Proposed Development is forecast to handle approximately 72 aircraft movements during a typical busy day and during the night-time period (between 23:00 and 07:00) it is forecast to handle an average of seven aircraft movements on a typical busy night.
- 12.7.41 At its forecast capacity, the Proposed Development will have a total of 19 freight stands and four passenger stands. The freight stands will be constructed at the north of the site and at the existing terminal building and therefore passenger stands will be constructed on the north-east of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> ExA emphasis

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site around a new passenger terminal.

12.7.45 The assessment of aircraft noise presents the combined noise effects of airside ground noise and aircraft air noise for the Proposed Development, including:

- Aircraft air noise the noise as aircraft depart from and arrive at the Proposed Development; and
- Airside ground noise the noise from aircraft and associate airport activities, including aircraft taxiing and manoeuvring on the ground, static and moving airfield plant.

12.7.46 Generally, aircraft air noise is the dominant source of noise, except in areas in close proximity to the airfield but away from the runway (i.e. Spitfire Way).

An Air Transport Movement (ATM) includes all landings and take-offs of commercial flights related to the transport of passengers and freight. All non-commercial aircraft movements which land or take-off from the airport are considered 'non-ATMs'."

Has the Applicant modelled the worst case scenario in its ES [APP-034] as contained in the NMP submitted at D5 ie:

- Quota Count night flights/year;
- 26,486 daytime ATMS/year; and
- 38,000 General Aviation movements/year?

Using RSP's own numbers in its ES, RSP modelled a maximum of 28,835 ATMs (79 ATMs per 24 hour period including seven night flights on average a night) plus 5,840 non ATMs (16 per 24 hour period x 365). In the NMP RSP is suggesting 26,486 ATMs plus 38,000 ATMs. This is considerably more ATMs than are in the ES. It is unclear whether the seven "late arrivals" or early departures expected per night in RSP's latest guess are included in this total.

In addition, there is the change in the expected fleet mix revealed by RSP at the ISH in March 2019. This change replaces a significant number of turbo prop ATMs with larger and noisier aircraft. We say more about that below. This change is not captured in the ES.

It is clear that RSP's ES does not model the worst case scenario. It understates the number of ATMs by almost 30,000. It does not reflect the fleet that RSP is now suggesting might be typical – about 25% of the fleet has been changed.

#### Ns.2.4 The Applicant

Noise insulation and its effectiveness at mitigating the adverse psychological and physiological health outcomes associated with aviation noise

The Applicant states in its response to ExA FWQ Ns.1.5.

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[REP3-195] on noise insulation and countering health effects of noise:

"Only limited direct evidence is available of the effect of noise insulation on reducing adverse health outcomes associated with aviation noise, as this has been little studied."

Given the above statement would the applicant agree that a balanced and proportionate approach would be to reduce the SOAEL for:

- Day (0700 2300) LAeq,16hr (free-field);
- Night (2300-0700) LAeq,8hr (free-field); and
- Night (2300 0700) LASmax (outside) for more than 18 nightly events?

In NNF14 at paras 11 to 13, NNF quoted from the WHO's 2018 report [previously submitted for D3]: "For average noise exposure, the GDG [Guideline Development Group] strongly recommends reducing noise levels produced by aircraft below 45 dB Lden, as aircraft noise above this level is associated with adverse health effects." and "For night noise exposure, the GDG strongly recommends reducing noise levels produced by aircraft during night time below 40 dB Lnight, as aircraft noise above this level is associated with adverse effects on sleep."

NNF09, submitted for D3, deals more fully with the noise impact of RSP's proposal and the unsatisfactory nature of both RSP's theoretical prediction of the noise its operations will produce and its assessment of the impact of airport noise on people and on the district. At para 91 of NNF09, we continue the WHO 2018 quote above: "To reduce health effects, the GDG strongly recommends that policy-makers implement suitable measures to reduce noise exposure from aircraft in the population exposed to levels above the guideline values for average and night noise exposure. For specific interventions the GDG recommends implementing suitable changes in infrastructure." And "The GDG acknowledged that the guideline recommendation for Lnight [i.e. 40 dB **Lnight] may not be fully protective of health**, as it implies that around 11% (95% CI: 4.72-17.81) of the population may be characterized as highly sleep-disturbed at the recommended Lnight level. This is higher than the 3% absolute risk considered for setting the guideline level." [our bold1

The WHO reports sleep disturbance at noise events measuring 45dB LAmax and under. The WHO concludes that the guidelines for maximum noise at night should therefore "be based on a combination of values of 30dBLAeq,8hr and 45dB LAmax." RSP ignores these guidelines.

RSP's proposed noise levels would have a significant adverse effect on a significant part of the local population. RSP ignores the fact that 40dB Lnight is not fully protective of health. RSP

is choosing to ignore the known fact that, when the airport was operational, people were awakened if one flight in excess of 80dB LASmax went over in a night. NNF has found no evidence of any other UK airport relying on Basner's work to suggest that 18 80dB flights a night will not cause any extra awakenings. We set out our deep concerns with RSP's use of Basner in our comments on the revised NMP which we have submitted to D6.

CAP 1588, the CAA's February 2018 findings on Aircraft Noise and Annoyance (referred to by the ExA in Ns 2.13 below) says on page 7 that: "the government decided to adopt the risk based approach proposed in their consultation, so that airspace decisions are made in line with the latest evidence and consistent with current guidance from the World Health Organisation." RSP is not following the Government's line. [our bold]

In addition, RSP is now claiming that it will not schedule night flights. This is sleight of hand as RSP then goes on to say that it will schedule flights between 0600 and 0700. This is night.

RSP is seeking a Quota Count of 3,028. This far exceeds the QC previously rejected by TDC. From October 2018 the quota count at LHRW is 5150 p.a. (2735 + 2415). This is against an annual movement cap of 480,000 ATMs p.a. The QC is a little over 1% of the movement cap. By contrast, RSP wants a QC of 3028 for 26,468 ATMs – 11.4% of its movement cap. This is excessive.

We understand that a QC total and an ATM total are not measuring the same unit. We are simply seeking here to draw a comparison between what LHRW thinks is necessary and the far bigger number that RSP claims will be necessary to enable it to handle "late arrivals" and early departures at a much smaller airport.

In all its theoretical assessments of potential future noise impact, RSP makes two consistent mistakes. RSP ignores the fact that it should be using metrics that assess the impact on populations not currently exposed to aviation noise. In addition, RSP has produced measurements of ambient noise that rely on static noise monitors having been located in the gardens of known airport supporters. Mark de Pulford submitted evidence on this for D5 at TR020002-003883. These ambient noise measures drive the later assessment of the scale of the noise impact of the developer's proposals. Para 12.6.25 of TR020002-002408 sets out relevant considerations as to whether there is an adverse effect as a result of the developer's proposals. Those considerations include:

- The magnitude of the effect
- The change in magnitude of the effect
- The type of effect, including its intermittency
- The existing sound environment

		<ul> <li>The effectiveness of mitigation, including BPM (best practicable means)</li> <li>The duration of effect [our bold].</li> <li>As RSP says in the same document at 12.7.65 "The magnitude of the impact will depend on the existing ambient noise level resulting from other noise sources in these communities." RSP's assessment of ambient noise was open to significant interference by its supporters. RSP has yet to answer questions as to why it used airport supporters to host its noise monitors.</li> <li>In addition, many of RSP's measurements rely on just one 30 minute recording on one day and one 15 minute recording on one night. These fleeting measures are then used as a proxy for the ambient noise level for an entire district. For example, the area of Beltinge, which stretches from the quiet seashore to the A299 and which includes over 6,500 people was measured at its noisiest location, a thin strip of land between the railway and the A299, for 30 minutes on one day and 15 minutes on one night. The measurement then given as the</li> </ul>
		ambient noise level for that entire land area bears no relation to the noise level typically experienced in this quiet residential area. And it is measurements like this that RSP uses to drive its assessment of the impact of its proposals. This is unsound.
Ns.2.5	The Applicant	Tranquil Open Spaces  Can the Applicant provide a map identifying tranquil open spaces under the flightpath swathes?
		It is hard to see how RSP can accurately have assessed the worst case impact of its proposals without having assessed the impact on tranquil spaces under a range of scenarios
Ns.2.7	The Applicant	Noise Mitigation Plan submitted at Deadline 5
		The NMP states at paragraphs 1.4-1.6:
		"1.4 An aircraft cannot take-off or be scheduled to land at night between 2300 and 0600
		1.5 An aircraft cannot take-off or land between the hours of 2300 and 0700 where: 1.5.1 the operator of that aircraft has not provided (prior to its take-off or prior to its landing time as appropriate) sufficient information to enable the airport operator to verify its noise classification and thereby its quota count; or 1.5.2 the operator claims that the aircraft is an exempt aircraft within paragraph 1.2, but the aircraft is not indicated as such an aircraft in Part 2 of Appendix 1 to this plan.
		1.6 Any aircraft which has a quota count of 8 or 16 cannot take-off or land at the airport during the hours of 2300 and 0700.".
		List all the circumstances under which an aircraft could take off or land between 2300-0600.

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Local residents lived with 15 years of commercial operations at Manston during which there were no scheduled night flights. Despite the fact that there were fewer than 2 cargo ATMs a day on average, we did suffer unscheduled night flights. In some cases, it became clear that the aircraft in question was regularly "late" and that it was allowed to land on every occasion that it was "late". When challenged, the airport operator would say that the plane had been scheduled to land at an earlier time, and that the "late" landing was therefore not a scheduled flight. Such a system is too open to manipulation. A frequent occurrence was for a dedicated freighter to depart Africa at a time later than it was scheduled to land at Manston. Therefore it was known before it took off that the plane would land in the night period. Nevertheless, these planes were always allowed to take off late and to land late at Manston. This was how the airport operator was able to welcome a number of night flights whilst saying that they were "unscheduled".

We comment in more detail on the NMP in our separate submission.

#### Ns.2.8 The Applicant

#### Noise Mitigation Plan submitted at Deadline 5

The NMP states at paragraph 10.1:

"Training flights

10.1 Other than General Aviation training that is based at Manston Airport, there will be no routine training flights."

- i. How many "non routine" training flights does the Applicant envisage per year?
- ii. Show how were "non routine" training flights included in the noise assessment?

RSP's directors and agents have consistently said at consultation events that there would be no training flights should the DCO be awarded. Training flights have a disproportionate impact on the local community as many of these flights practise "touch and go" landings and take offs over and over again for a long period of time. The noise is unrelenting. RSP's case is that the DCO is needed for a cargo airport. There is no case to add training flights to this proposal. This would appear to be an opportunistic add-on in a bid to find additional sources of revenue for RSP's proposal.

If the ExA is minded to approve the DCO then we urge the panel to strike out training flights – routine or non-routine. Their negative impact on the local population is unacceptable. When they took place in the past they always attracted a disproportionate number of complaints from residents (this can be seen in the KIACC minutes). If "non-routine" training flights are to be allowed (and we can see absolutely no case for doing so) then RSP should be obliged to set out a clear definition of "routine" and "non-routine" as well as an annual

		cap
Ns.2.9	The Applicant Thanet DC	Noise Mitigation Requirement 9 in DCO submitted at Deadline 5
	Thunes BC	Requirement 9 currently reads as follows:
		"Noise mitigation 9. The authorised development must be operated in accordance with the noise mitigation plan."
		i. Is Thanet DC satisfied with this wording?
		ii. If not, would it like to propose alternative wording?
		What security does this offer residents? The NMP is capable of being amended at any time. If RSP is serious about its desire to mitigate the heavy impact of its potential commercial venture on the health, well-being and quality of life of local residents, it will not cavil if required to capture the final agreement in a form that means that it cannot be rewritten as soon as the DCO is awarded.
Ns.2.10	The Applicant	Noise insulation and ventilation in schools
	Kent CC	The Applicant states at paragraph C 2.14 of the Noise Summary submitted at Deadline 5:
		"The revised Noise Mitigation Plan included an express provision for schools to apply to the Community Consultative Committee for funds from the Community Trust Fund. In addition a schools liaison programme is now included in the Noise Mitigation Plan."
		i. Can the Applicant explain why are schools not part of the Applicants' direct insulation and ventilation scheme?
		ii. Can Kent CC provide an estimate of the potential costs associated with insulating and ventilating a primary school in Kent?
		We comment on this in our submission on the NMP. The CTF will be cash limited. The CCC is not in a position to oblige the operator to provide more money. The annual amount of money envisaged for the CTF is pitifully small. Local schools would have to compete for a very, very tiny amount of money with no guarantee of receiving anything.
Ns.2.11	The Applicant	Traffic Assessment for Deadline 5
		The TA addendum states:
		"5.1.1 An assessment of the revised traffic model has identified a number of road links which could be subject to a greater than 1dB change in noise level as a result of the Proposed Development. This was the screening criterion used for triggering a need to undertake a more detailed noise assessment as set out in our assessment methodology contained in the ES [APP-033,034,035].

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		<ul> <li>5.1.2 It is therefore concluded that furthermore detailed road traffic noise assessment is required to supplement the ES chapter on noise because of the revised traffic data.</li> <li>5.1.3 It is expected that revised modelling to confirm the findings of the ES will be submitted at Deadline 6³."</li> <li>Can the Applicant produce the following cumulative noise contour maps for the assessment of significant effects for operational noise from road traffic (night and day) and air traffic following the new TA modelling at Deadline 6?</li> <li>Aircraft/traffic noise – daytime LAeq,16hr contours – opening year;</li> <li>Aircraft/Traffic noise – night-time LAeq, 8hr contours – opening year;</li> <li>Aircraft/Traffic noise – night-time LAeq,8hr contours – year of maximum forecast capacity;</li> <li>Aircraft/Traffic noise – night-time LASmax contours – opening year;</li> <li>Aircraft/Traffic noise – night-time LASmax contours – year of maximum forecast capacity;</li> <li>Aircraft/Traffic noise – night-time N80 contours – opening year;</li> <li>Aircraft/Traffic noise – night-time N80 contours – year of maximum forecast capacity;</li> <li>Aircraft/Traffic noise – night-time N80 contours – opening year;</li> <li>Aircraft/Traffic noise – day-time N60 contours – opening year; and</li> <li>Aircraft/Traffic noise – night-time N60 contours – year of maximum forecast capacity.</li> </ul>
		Thank you for requesting this. Can the Applicant also be asked to explain why it has steadfastly avoided paying any attention to historical noise contour maps; historical noise monitoring records; and the past experience of residents that one flight a night can and will cause "awakenings"?
Ns.2.12	The Applicant	Manston Green Housing Development
		The noise sensitive receptors closest to the airport are identified in Chapter 12 of the ES [APP-034], however, no reference is made to the Manston Green Development. The only reference to Manston Green is within Chapter 18 which refers to cumulative effects which concludes that Manston Green (Site ID143) [APP-035] would be subject to a significant adverse effect from the proposed commercial airport in Year 20.
		i. Provide an estimate of the number of properties in Manston Green that would be potentially significantly affected?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> At paragraph 2.13 of its Noise Summary submitted at Deadline 5 that: "The Applicant stated that traffic noise was not included in the model as its contribution to the noise environment at receptors affected by aircraft noise was expected to have a negligible effect."

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It is specified in para. 18.5.114 of the ES [APP-035] that the consent for Manston Green was consented under the provisions of Local Plan 2006 and therefore assumed existence and operation of the Airport.

ii. Point to where in Chapter 12 [APP-034] or Chapter 18 [APP-035] it refers to the site constraints and whether the proposed commercial airport would affect the future development of Manston Green?

In a letter to TDC dated 4th October 2018, Iceni Projects, acting for Cogent Land (CL) at Manston Green, says [letter attached at Appendix Two]:

"Having assumed the closure of the airport in the long term, CL's Manston Green outline consent has been designed around a certain noise level, with the expectation that there would be no significant noise disturbance and no need therefore for specific noise attenuation/mitigation measures to be designed in. Given that Manston Airport consultation document (2017) prepared by RiverOak Strategic contained no information on noise, it's anticipated that such measures will be required if the airport expansion proposals proceed and the associated costs of these measures will have a material impact on scheme viability." [our bold]

Planning permission for Manston Green was given in 2016; two years after the airport had closed, and before the DCO process began.

The location of Manston Green, 1km from the airport, means that the development location for 785 homes is considerably closer to the airport than is Clarendon School. Clarendon School was the site for one of the noise monitors for some years when the airport was operational. NNF has already submitted records from that monitor recording noise levels of over 100dB from aircraft using Manston. It is worth reinforcing the point that the decibel scale is logarithmic, and so noise levels of 100dB are significantly more noisy than, say, noise levels of 80dB or 55dB.

In 2009, when the airport was operational, TDC gave planning permission for a two storey dwelling to be built in St Mildred's Road, Ramsgate. St Mildred's Road is in the centre of town towards the harbour and noticeably further from the runway than the Manston Green development will be. A condition was imposed that the St Mildred's developer should first submit for approval a noise attenuation scheme, reflecting the fact that the proposed dwelling would be affected by being in the 57-63dB LAeq 24hours contour for aircraft noise. RSP's theoretical contour maps do not reflect this reality. The developer was asked to provide a scheme that would achieve 20dB of attenuation. The officer's report is attached at the end of this document at Appendix One.

Given the very small amount of money that RSP says it will

		need for noise mitigation and/or for compensation, RSP's proposal clearly has not taken into account the threat to the viability of the development scheme at Manston Green. Realistic costs need to be added to RSP's business plan, as and when that plan finally sees the light of day.  As importantly, RSP's theoretical noise contours are at odds with the noise contours produced by TDC and the airport operator when the airport was open. It should be remembered that the airport that produced those contours handled far fewer ATMs than RSP hopes will use a cargo airport at Manston.  NNF has significant doubts about the accuracy of RSP's noise contours. They clearly do not reflect reality.
Ns.2.13	The Applicant	SOAEL daytime
		The Applicant at paragraph 12.6.64 of the ES [APP-034] states:
		"12.6.64 For the daytime period, a significant adverse effect is determined to occur when average absolute free-field operational noise exposures are greater than 63 dB LAeq,16hr. This has been defined as the SOAEL for daytime aircraft operational noise and is based upon the Aviation Policy Framework (Paragraphs 3.37-3.39), which indicates that above 63 dB LAeq,16hr, airports should provide assistance towards noise insulation at noise-sensitive buildings and residential dwellings."
		The Aviation Policy Framework is dated 2013. Paragraph 3.17 states:
		"We will continue to treat the 57dB LAeq 16 hour contour as the average level of daytime aircraft noise marking the approximate onset of significant community annoyance. However, this does not mean that all people within this contour will experience significant adverse effects from aircraft noise. Nor does it mean that no-one outside of this contour will consider themselves annoyed by aircraft noise."
		The CAA's recent findings on Aircraft Noise and Annoyance (February 2018) makes reference to UK policy in relation to an 'annoyance threshold' and highlights 57dB LAeq (16 hour) as marking the approximate onset of significant community annoyance. 3 <sup>rd</sup> paragraph page 6 states:
		"The government published their Response to their Airspace Consultation in 2017 and acknowledged the evidence from the SoNA study, which showed that sensitivity to aircraft noise has increased, with the same percentage of people reporting to be highly annoyed at a level of 54 dB LAeq,16hr as occurred at 57 dB LAeq,16hr in the past."
		In the light of these recent studies can the Applicant explain why it is still using daytime SOAEL of 63dB LA <sub>eq</sub>

		16hr?
		Please can the ExA draw the Applicant's attention to the recommendations of the WHO 2018 report (we deal with this in NNF14 and in NNF09 pages 23 to 27 and submitted the report itself previously). In the light of the fact that RSP is proposing a new airport, and the fact that the local population is not now subjected to airport noise, there is no justification whatsoever for RSP to be permitted to start a new operation that is predicted to create a noise nuisance at a level that is well above the level recommended by the WHO as being the maximum level advisable for the protection of human health. We are not here in a situation where there is an existing noise nuisance whose impact it is accepted will need to be managed down over time to an acceptable level. RSP wishes to creates a brand new noise nuisance that will ignore the guidelines on aviation noise levels set out by the WHO in the last few months. This is unacceptable. RSP should be obliged to work within the levels of noise recommended by the WHO as being the maximum advisable so that the operation avoids too great an adverse impact on those who will be subjected to the noise created by that operation
Ns.2.14	The Applicant	Uncertainty in noise modelling
		The Applicant states in it Noise Summary submitted at Deadline 5 paragraph b 2.9:
		"2.9 The Applicant stated that there was a level of uncertainty associated with any model, as its accuracy is dependent on its parameters. The Applicant confirmed that the Integrated Noise Model (INM) used was a validated noise model."
		How is the level of uncertainty quantified i.e.+ or - % or dB,- and expressed in the assessment?
		We also look forward to seeing RSP being challenged as to why it allowed SMAa members to host the noise monitors on which a significant amount of the local assessment of ambient noise depends, and why RSP refuses to address the gap between the known and recorded past noise impact of a much smaller operation at this airport and its current, theoretical, desk-based assessment of what the future noise impact for a much larger operation might be.
Ns.2.15	The Applicant	Sensitivity testing
		For the purposes of this proposed development, the Significant Adverse Effect Level (SOAEL) has been set at 63 dB LAeq,16h (Applicants response to FWQs Ns 1.1). Paragraph 12.6.64 of the ES [APP-034] states:
		"For the daytime period, a significant adverse effect is determined to occur when average absolute free-field operational noise exposures are greater than 63 dB LAeq,16hr. This has been defined as the SOAEL for daytime aircraft operational noise and is based upon the Aviation Policy

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Framework 2013 (Paragraphs 3.37-3.39), which indicates that above 63 dB LAeq,16hr, airports should provide assistance towards noise insulation at noise-sensitive buildings and residential dwellings."

The Applicant states at paragraph 2.6 of the Noise Summary submitted at Deadline 5:

"2.6 Following a question from the ExA the Applicant explained that an increase of 0-3dB should be considered negligible in the long term."

# Carry out sensitivity testing to be submitted at Deadline 6, to see how many additional properties would be above a:

- Significant Adverse Effect Level (SOAEL) set at 62, 61, 60 dB LAeq,16h;
- **UAEL** of 68, 67, 66 dB LAeq,16hr; and
- night time SOAEL of 54, 53,52 dB LAeq,8hr.

Another important question is what would the impact be on RSP's calculations of impact if it is accepted that the ambient noise measures presented by RSP are unsafe? RSP cannot guarantee to the ExA that those measures are truly objective. Given that the assessment of the extent of the noise impact depends in part on the extent of the increase between today's level of noise and the assessed future level, RSP's metrics are doubly flawed. The assessment of today's noise level either cannot be relied upon or is based on fleeting time samples. The theoretical noise contours do not reflect previous past experience. RSP says that "an increase of 0-3dB should be considered negligible in the long term", and yet there is no certainty that an increase in the noise level at a particular location would be between 0-3dB if the start point (the ambient noise level) cannot be relied upon and neither can the end point (RSP's theoretical noise contours).

#### Ns.2.17 | The Applicant

#### **Additional awakenings**

The Applicant acknowledges that the Basner 2006 study (Aircraft noise effects on sleep: Application of the results of a large polysomnographic field study. *The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America* 119, 2772 (2006) was based on residents already exposed to aircraft noise (Noise Summary submission at Deadline 5).

"The study investigated 61 residents in the vicinity of Cologne / Bonn airport over 9 nights. It is the most comprehensive study on aircraft noise awakenings to date. As acknowledged by Public Health England [paragraphs 4.1.15 of the Draft Statement of Common Ground between the Applicant and Public Health England REP4-008] the data still under-pins the most recent WHO guidelines on sleep disturbance (Environmental Noise Guidelines for the European Region: A Systematic Review on Environmental Noise and Effects on

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Sleep). Similar studies have not been undertaken for new airports.

RSP chooses to focus purely on "awakenings". It must be recognised that the WHO 2018 guidelines also considered the research into other impacts of aviation noise such as cardiovascular disease, annoyance, cognitive impairment, hearing impairment and tinnitus, adverse birth outcomes, quality of life, well-being and mental health, metabolic outcomes and a range of impacts on sleep. "Awakening" is just one part of the problem.

At page 75, the WHO 2018 Guidelines say: "There is additional uncertainty when characterizing exposure using the acoustical description of aircraft noise by means of Lden or Lnight. Use of these average noise indicators may limit the ability to observe associations between exposure to aircraft noise and some health outcomes (such as awakening reactions); as such, noise indicators based on the number of events (such as the frequency distribution of LA,max) may be better suited."

Our study of additional awakenings was undertaken in Year 2 and Year 20. In Year 20, the surrounding population **will have become habituated** to aircraft noise."

Point to any published evidence which supports their assertion that the "surrounding population will have become habituated to aircraft noise."?

This is a quite extraordinary assertion by the Applicant. The Applicant should be directed to produce evidence from the consultative committees of UK airports to support its assertion that the surrounding populations have become habituated to aircraft noise. It is impossible to square this glib assertion with the growing body of evidence that shows that people over time are becoming "annoyed" by lower levels of aircraft noise. We are not becoming "habituated", we are becoming increasingly bothered by aviation noise. It is also impossible to square this assertion with the response of local residents to the proposal to expand Heathrow. Had the local population become habituated to aircraft noise, we would expect to see a much higher level of support for the proposals from residents and far less concern expressed about noise.

We look forward to seeing hard evidence on this that reflects a UK reality.

The Applicant goes on to say:

"In Year 20 the number of events was significantly below the threshold for triggering additional awakenings. In Year 2, the forecast aircraft movements are much lower. In Year 2 paragraph 12.7.56 of the ES [APP-033,034,035] stated that "N-above contours demonstrate that residential properties in the vicinity of the Proposed Development will be exposed to up to one aircraft noise event in excess of 80 dB LASmax on an average night". This is a very low number of noise events.

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Because of this, and whilst the Basner research is based on people already exposed to aircraft noise, it is considered unlikely that an equivalent study for a new airport would alter the conclusions of the ES for the opening, even if such a study was available."

Point to any published evidence which supports their assertion that "it is considered unlikely that an equivalent study for a new airport would alter the conclusions of the ES for the opening"?

We know of no UK airport that is basing its NMP on Basner.

Certainly we see no evidence that the operator at Heathrow or the UK Government is suggesting that 18 noise events a night of over 80dB LASmax will not create additional awakenings. It would be an unusual step for the ExA to approve RSP's proposed night flight regime based on this one out-of-date study. There is so much more current research work on the impact of aviation noise at night available in the public eye to which the UK Government is currently giving weight.

We have commented in detail on the Basner study over and over again in our response to the various consultations; in NNF01; NNF09 and NNF14. We have put forward evidence that this theory clearly does not represent the reality of the local population. We have produced written evidence that people were awoken by one night flight. We genuinely do not know how we can make our voice heard on this. The experience of trying to get our point across is akin to shouting into the void. RSP has been allowed to ignore the recorded reality. This is absolutely unacceptable.

We know that people will be woken by just one night flight in an eight hour period because they were woken in the past when this happened. RSP can cling to Basner for all it is worth, but the fact is that Basner does no more than present a theory. NNF is presenting recorded evidence of the actual impact of night flights on this particular population. RSP's Mr Freudmann knows that we are right. That should be the end of the discussion.

RSP's repeated assertion that 18 flights a night of 80dB LASmax will have no impact on thousands of local residents under the flight paths is a measure of the extent to which RSP is prepared to ignore evidence and to ride roughshod over local residents in the pursuit of the land that it wants.

#### Ns.2.18 The Applicant

#### Aircraft fleet mix

The applicant at the Need Hearing on the 21 March 2019 made clear that conventional integrator operations are no longer expected at Manston and that such movements would be made instead by 'New' e-commerce integrators operating a different pattern of flights not requiring night operations.

Given that 48% of the movements in Year 20 are shown in the

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ES (Appendix 3.3 [APP-044]) to be by a conventional integrator, of which half were expected to be using quiet ATR-72 turbo-prop aircraft, the substitution of these movements by a 'New' integrator would be expected to use more Boeing B737 types rather than turbo-props.

The Applicant stated at the Need Hearing ISH2 that the noise assessments were made on the basis of the specific fleet mix set out in Appendix 3.3. of the ES [APP-044], including by reference to the individual aircraft and their engine types operated by the named airlines in that Appendix.

Given the likely change in the nature of the operators and the fact that several of the airlines do not operate freighter aircraft of the types specified (see York Aviation 2019 Report para. 3.10), would the Applicant agree (and if not why not) that the fleet mix assessed is almost certain to understate noise exposure relative to what is now proposed?

The simple answer, as we suspect the ExA has identified, is "yes". RSP has changed the fleet mix, swapping less noisy planes for noisier ones. It has added thousands of GA flights. It has changed the timing of its forecast night flights, with a bunching now at 0600-0700. There is no confidence that the ES measures the "worst case" noise scenario.

#### Ns.2.19 | The Applicant

#### **Flightpaths**

The assessment appears to be based on assumptions about flight paths that rely on broader airspace changes to be delivered as part of the Future Airspace Strategy Implementation South (FASI S) Airspace change programme (Government/CAA Airspace Modernisation Strategy), which will require coordination with NATS and other airports.

There can be no certainty that the proposed flightpaths which the noise assessment is based on will be deliverable.

Would the Applicant agree that a worst case assessment would need to be based on flightpaths as previously operated when the airport was open?

This is NNF's position. In contrast, RSP was always keen to tell residents at consultation that the flight paths could be changed for the better. In truth, the safest worst case is to assume that the flight paths would be what was in the AIPs when the airport was operational – i.e. for the bigger craft a straight line approach to the runway over 10 full miles and a departure path to the west that allowed craft to turn right soon after take-off. The Applicant should also be obliged to model the reality which is that arrivals and departures do not all stick to one pencil thin line on the map – the flight path is much wider than that. RSP needs to produce accurate models of the worst case scenario. These can then be compared to the noise modelling carried out when the airport was operational

Ns.2.20	The Applicant	Noise Impact Assessment
		i. In the light of the change to the night flights noise policy and the changes to the types of airline expected to operate, does the Applicant agree that there will need to be changes made to assessment of noise effects?
		ii. Does the Applicant agree that the potential effects of this will almost certainly increase the financial liability for compensation and mitigation. Set out the changes and the potential effects?
		The Applicant needs to provide ambient noise measurements that are not cast into doubt by noise monitors being hosted in the gardens of supporters. It also needs to produce noise assessments based on the fleet mix that it now says is likely; the ATM count that it now says is likely; the allocation across day and night that it now says is likely; the subsequent road traffic volumes that will now be likely; and the actual historical flight paths. If it does not do this, the Applicant's ES simply cannot be taken to assess the worst case and its business plan (should one be produced) will clearly not capture the full cost of the proposed development.
Ns.2.23	The Applicant	Noise contours
		The ExA notes the Applicants response in relation to the criteria for community trust fund monies in FWQ NS1.31[REP3-195]. The Applicant states that the extent of LASmax contours is not part of the assessment of adverse effects.
		Noting this, explain ES Tables 12.12 and 12.13 [APP-034] which uses $L_{\text{ASmax}}$ contours as a measure of impact.
		The aircraft noise generated by RSP's proposal will comprise a series of discrete noise events. It will not generate a uniform, average hum of noise. RSP knows this.
		RSP also knows that it intends large cargo planes to be the core of its business. The noise that a large cargo plane makes as it overflies Ramsgate and the nearby villages is known – NNF has already submitted evidence of noise monitor records. That noise is significant. At 80dB to 100dB it is enough to have an impact on the ability of nearby residents to enjoy their home and to continue normal day-to-day activities such as holding a conversation or watching the television. Communities as far away as Herne Bay have previously complained about the intrusion of aircraft noise into their life from operations at Manston. RSP's proposal seeks to ignore this fact.
		There is no justification for RSP to limit the spending of CTF monies (limited though they will be) to projects that will benefit only those immediately next to the airport. RSP's

		consistent reliance on LAeq measures demonstrates its desire to take no responsibility for the negative impacts of its proposal on tens of thousands of people. This is unsupportable.
Ns.2.24 The Ap	The Applicant	Provide a reasoned argument as to whether the Applicant considers that, given that ES Vol 2, Chapter 12 [APP-034], 12.7.70 states that in specified locations:  "The effect would be characterised as a perceived change in quality of life for occupants of buildings in these communities"  Article 8 of Schedule I to the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 1 of the First Protocol to that Act are engaged in such locations.
		There is legal precedent to suggest that Article 8 is engaged in cases in which decisions are being taken that will lead to aviation noise having a negative impact on people and their life (Hatton & others v UK). This places clear responsibility on the Applicant to demonstrate the 'need' for its project, and responsibility on the ExA (and ultimately the Secretary of State for Transport) to show proportionality in any decision that it might make to award a DCO in this case.
		RSP has failed to provide a robust or even credible case on "need". RSP has not produced a clear assessment of the community benefits that it says would arise from the implementation of its proposal. There is very little evidence before the ExA on possible benefits that it can weigh against the clear harm that will be caused to local people; the local environment; the local economy; and to the wider UK environmental climate if this DCO application were ever to be approved.
		In addition, RSP has specifically produced no assessment of the benefits that would arise from its suggested night flight regime. The Government's Impact Assessment for Night Flight Restrictions at the Designated Airports, 2017- 2022 [attached at Appendix Three] explicitly recognises the need to do this, mentioning the Hatton judgment on page 20 and saying: "Firstly, previous legal judgments on the night flights regime have also ruled that night flights adversely affect the rights of people living near airports; and that the Government has an obligation to balance the rights of those persons with the economic interests of those operating and benefiting from those flights."
		NNF has provided evidence that a very similar night flight regime to the one being proposed by RSP was assessed by independent noise consultants for TDC and that the conclusion was that the harm to the community outweighed the possible benefit. There is little before the ExA to enable it to consider whether it could "balance the rights of those persons with the economic interests of those operating and benefiting from those flights". NNF09 sets out the work of Bureau Veritas on

		the previous night flight application. Bureau Veritas said that the population within the 85 dB (A) SEL contour affected by a flight departure to the east over the centre of residential Ramsgate would be "up to 30,903 [people] for the Boeing 747-400". Bureau Veritas concluded that: "the predicted number of people likely to be exposed to significant levels of average night-time noise is not sufficiently justified by the number of passengers and freight activity that are forecast to benefit from the proposals. This is on the basis that the number of people likely to be impacted by night noise at MSE, normalised with respect to the annual passenger throughput, is greater than that at each of the designated London airports."		
		The case remains the same for RSP's current night flight proposals.  RSP needs to provide an evidence-based assessment of the extent to which it can demonstrate that its proposal provides benefits that clearly outweigh the harm to local people and to their environment that will be caused by a cargo airport being developed at Manston. The assessment of disadvantages will need to include an assessment of negative impacts on health, well-being, and quality of life; on educational attainment; on the local tourism-dependent economy; on roads; on the natural environment – including the impact of considerable pollution and the increased use of less suitable sites for the thousands of homes that were to be on the old airport site.		
Op.1	Operational is	ssues		
OP.2.6	The Applicant	At the Need and Operations Hearing (21/03/19) it was confirmed by the applicant that they have programmed to		
		start the construction of the Airport in 2021, with operations beginning from quarter 1 of 2022, and that circa £180million would be spend on construction in this calendar year. At the Noise hearing (22/03/19) it was confirmed that no construction works would take place at night.		
		beginning from quarter 1 of 2022, and that circa £180million would be spend on construction in this calendar year. At the Noise hearing (22/03/19) it was confirmed that no		
		beginning from quarter 1 of 2022, and that circa £180million would be spend on construction in this calendar year. At the Noise hearing (22/03/19) it was confirmed that no construction works would take place at night.  i. Is the ExA's understanding of this programme		
		beginning from quarter 1 of 2022, and that circa £180million would be spend on construction in this calendar year. At the Noise hearing (22/03/19) it was confirmed that no construction works would take place at night.  i. Is the ExA's understanding of this programme correct?  ii. Comment on how the revised start date of operations affects the provided forecasts		
		beginning from quarter 1 of 2022, and that circa £180million would be spend on construction in this calendar year. At the Noise hearing (22/03/19) it was confirmed that no construction works would take place at night.  i. Is the ExA's understanding of this programme correct?  ii. Comment on how the revised start date of operations affects the provided forecasts contained within the Azimuth Report [APP-085].  iii. Define the night time period for the proposed		

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NNF was present for these hearings and the ExA's understanding is clearly correct. We urge the ExA to oblige the Applicant to provide a construction programme that is fully costed. The sparse information that the Applicant has produced to date is so thin as to make it impossible for the ExA, or anyone else, to understand and challenge the assumptions that lie behind it.

In particular, if RSP's position is that it will complete all these works by the end of 2021, RSP also needs to set out what assumptions it is making as to where it will source construction workers and the impact of this accelerated development programme on its vague assertions about training and employing local people.

#### OP.2.7 The Applicant

#### **Public Safety Zones**

At the need and operations Issue Specific Hearing (21 March 2019) it was confirmed that general aviation movements would be counted in the number of flights required before public safety zones are designated. An indicative drawing has been produced.

- i. Bearing in mind this answer, at what year of operation would you expect PSZ's to be required at Manston?
- ii. Has this been taken account of in the Environmental Statement?
- iii. Has the PSZ drawing taken account of the forecasts, or is it mainly based on the PSZs at other airports?

The need for PSZs has emphatically not been taken into account in the ES. RSP has consistently taken the view that PSZs will not be required and/or that they can be provided easily at a later stage and so they do not need to be considered now.

We urge the ExA to require RSP to set out the land take that might be needed for appropriate PSZs to be implemented, and also to spell out the implications for those residents living in the outer PSZ zone who might find that any future building development plans will be constrained – DfT Circular 1/2010 says that: "...there is a general presumption against new or replacement development, or changes of use of existing buildings, within Public Safety Zones.". This is an issue that NNF brought to RSP's attention in July 2017 and again since then. NNF made it clear that RSP should consult the public on the implications for local residents of implementing an appropriate PSZ. RSP did not do so.

The public has not been consulted on the implications of PSZs for their homes, their all day work places, and for their future building development plans.

SE.1	Socio-econom	-economic Effects		
SE.2.1	The Applicant	Construction		
		At the need and operations Issue Specific Hearing (21 March 2019) it was stated that you would aim to re-open the Airport from quarter 1 of 2022. It was acknowledged that this would necessitate construction during 2021, and that additionally no construction works would take place during the night time.		
		<ul><li>i. Would such a programme have any effect on projected construction jobs?</li></ul>		
		ii. What percentage of these jobs would be able to be filled by people from the local area, given the timescale and local skill levels?		
		iii. Has this construction timetable been factored into the transport assessment?		
		We are pleased to see these questions. We have raised these points in our response to Op 2.6 above.		
SE.2.2	The Applicant	Employment - Comparators		
		Volume 4 of the Azimuth Report [APP-085] uses East Midlands Airport (EMA) as a comparator for direct job levels, with a 2% adjustment used from yr 11.		
		i. Do the figures used from EMA include jobs acros that airport site, including those based at the Pegasus Business Park?		
		NNF responds to this question at SE 2.3 below		
		ii. If so, given evidence that much of the business park constitutes non-airport related development and employment, how useful are such employment figures for comparison purposes?		
		iii. Of the employment figures for EMA, what percentage are within the aviation industry?		
		iv. Provide justification for the 2% adjustment from year 11. Would the opposite not be true, given economies of scale once operations became established?		
SE.2.3	The Applicant	Employment – Comparators  No Night Flights [REP4-056] state that in 2016 EMA had 540 employees, with 55,000 ATMs, but note that the proposal includes 1,024 jobs for 26,468 ATMS in year 20 almost twice the number of jobs for half the number of ATMs.		
		i. Are these figures correct?		
		ii. If so, justify give the apparent disparity between		

		the figures shown.
		It is clear from the most recent Annual Report produced for EMA that the NNF representation is correct. On page 92 of the 2017-2018 Annual Report [sent as a separate document], Manchester Airports Group (MAG) reports that the average number of persons (including executive directors) employed by the Group during the year at EMA was 629. In 2018, CAA data records EMA as handling 56,947 ATMs in 2018 of which 22,219 ATMs were cargo flights. Crudely, this equates to 90.5 ATMs per employee, as compared to the Azimuth "forecast" of 25.8 ATMs per person (26,468÷1024). Even if we add 38,000 GA ATMs to the Manston total, the ratio is still 62.9 ATMs per person.
		RSP's job numbers are clearly overstated.
SE.2.6	The Applicant	Thanet DC [REP3-010] consider that there remains significant uncertainty about whether the socio-economic benefits from the proposal, in terms of job creation, attract significant weight in support of the proposal and consider that such benefits may have been potentially overstated in the ES. It notes that the figures predicted for year 20 would represent 8.3% of all jobs in Thanet and consider that the magnitude of change for the number of jobs created needs to be reassessed against the total number of jobs in the District to reflect the actual impact on employment, with such an effect potentially not falling within the category of 'major beneficial - significance'  Provide any evidenced counter arguments to this viewpoint.
		NNF shares TDC's view. NNF has provided evidence on the considerable gap over the years between <b>every</b> jobs forecast made for Manston Airport and the actual number of jobs delivered. NNF has commented on this consistent trend in NNF06, and on the RSP jobs "forecasts" in NNF01, NNF08 and NNF11 (see particularly pages 22 to 34 of NNF11). No reliance can be placed on Dr Dixon's employment creation "forecasts" given that they rest on a fundamentally flawed set of assumptions about the possible future number of ATMs at Manston. Dr Dixon then makes her employment forecasts even less credible by producing a "mash up" of jobs numbers and multipliers using historical Manston employment numbers; numbers from East Midlands; and multipliers from sources such as Stansted, Luton and the ICAO.
SE.2.8	The Applicant	Catalytic jobs  The calculation of catalytic job figures use an ICAO formula, which appears to be a national figure, but is applied at a local level.  i. Do you consider that the nationally based

		multipliers used for induced and catalytic job totals are appropriate within the local context of Manston, and if so, why?	
		ii. If so, how would this affect your predicted job numbers?	
		NNF deals with this in NNF11 pages 32 to 34	
SE.2.9	The Applicant	Displacement	
		Your answer to SE1.6 [REP3-195] considered that, as the proposal will currently meet unmet demand rather than displacing existing business from other airports that no account of job transfers or losses from other areas has been incorporated into the assessment.	
		However, the Azimuth report [APP-085] states that consideration of costs of switching airlines/forwarders has been taken into account, which implies that some demand would have been displaced from elsewhere. Furthermore, the answer to SE1.1 states that significant effects on outbound tourism are not anticipated as existing connections, including Gatwick, Heathrow, and London City Airports, Ebbsfleet International for trains to the continent and cross channel ferry via Dover already exist. This also implies that outbound tourism business may be displaced from other existing areas, both within the South East, and within Kent itself.	
		Do you maintain the view that the proposal would solely meet unmet demand, and if so, do you have further justification for this viewpoint?	
this cont Manston airports find it at attract of the UK a Both the win for N haulage sea or ra	NNF is struggling with the idea that there is such a thing in this context as "unmet demand". It is RSP's contention that Manston will attract business from operators at other UK airports who want daytime runway capacity but who cannot find it at their existing airport. RSP also contends that it will attract cargo tonnage that is currently being trucked between the UK and Europe for want of runway capacity in the UK. Both these streams of activity and employment exist today. A win for Manston is a loss for another UK airport or for a haulage company (some of which will be UK based) or for the sea or rail crossing at the Channel (with subsequent employment losses on both sides of the Channel).		
		There is zero evidence that RSP is going to conjure up out of the ether cargo business that does not exist in any other form today. The UK market for air freight is static.	
		Mr Cain talked blithely about "new integrators" which he says would create new demand. Dr Dixon talked about 17% of the goods market being managed through online channels and suggested that this would create new demand. Neither of them dealt with the fact that new channels of purchasing do not equate to an increase in cargo ATMs. NNF submitted evidence on this in NNF06 and NNF08.	

		Statistics compiled by the Office for National Statistics and by Statista do show a steep increase in the percentage of UK sales made via ecommerce channels between 2000 and 2011. During 2014 to 2017, ecommerce's share of the UK market then stabilised at about 16.5%. However, UK total air freight tonnage in that same period has stagnated at about 2.3m tonnes, and the number of freighter ATMs has fallen dramatically since 2000. There is no evidence that a significant shift to ecommerce since 2000 has led to a subsequent increase in demand for UK air freight or to an increase in UK air freight ATMs.  In short, RSP has yet to identify any "unmet demand". The demand that it wishes to capture for a cargo airport at Manston exists today. Any shift of that business to Manston will mean the loss of jobs elsewhere. RS has not set out how it has dealt with this in its jobs creation forecasts, relying instead on airy assertions that it has done so. NNF submits that RSP should be obliged to share the detail of these calculations. Without this information, RSP's claims of net employment creation cannot be assessed.	
SE.2.10	The Applicant	Displacement  The case for need is based to a certain extent upon the extent of trucking between the south east and the continent  Would the proposal result in the loss of existing	
		trucking/logistics employment, either in transit or at the port of Dover?  It would, and RSP has not calculated the impact of this.	
SE.2.12	The Applicant	<b>Tourism</b> Paragraph 13.8.77 of Chapter 13, Volume 2 of the ES [APP-034] states that Thanet has approximately 3.1 million visitors annually, of which 75% are day visitors, meaning the remaining 775,000 individuals are overnight stay visitors. The ES further notes that anticipated passenger numbers associated with the proposal are around 1.4million in Year 20 and considers that this additional flux of people, if assumed to all be overnight stays results in a net increase of 81.6% compared to current annual tourist visitors, with 25% of visitors as overnight stays providing a potential for net increase of approximately 45.4% (paragraph 13.8.78).	
		<ul> <li>i. 1.4 million passengers per annum equates roughly to around 700,000 passengers each way (if assuming passengers will generally use the same airport for inbound and outbound flights). Do you consider passengers are likely to stay overnight in Thanet before and after their outbound and return flight?</li> <li>ii. Would it be fair to assume that many outbound passengers would be resident within the local</li> </ul>	

		area and so would have no need to stay overnight?
		iii. Do you consider therefore the figures within the ES are likely to be accurate?
		The figures in the ES ignore the past reality that, when Manston was operational, it was a net exporter of people for trips and overnight stays. Infratil reported that twice as many people took the opportunity to use Manston to enable them to fly to other destinations for business and leisure as took the opportunity to fly into Manston from other areas. On this basis, if we take RSP's pax aspirations as a start point (and they are no more than aspirations as they have no basis in anything that has ever been achieved at Manston in the past) then, on past experience, one third of them would be expected to start their journey elsewhere and to have their outbound journey into Manston. Of these 467,000 "non-local" pax (again, using RSP's numbers here purely for demonstration purposes) there is no evidence whatsoever from RSP that their final destination for business, leisure and local spend would be Thanet or even East Kent. Even if we were to assume optimistically that 25% of them might stay in or visit the district, that would equate to 116,667 visits. This pales into insignificance against the number of existing visitors to Thanet and to the percentage of them that are likely to be persuaded to stay away from Ramsgate alone by virtue of the town and its attractions being under the flight path of a cargo airport operating 24/7.
		RSP's evidence on likely passenger numbers who might "stick" in Thanet rather than passing straight through is wafer thin.
SE.2.13	The Applicant	What effect would the acknowledged increase in the absolute noise level and the visibility of planes overflying Ramsgate have on the existing and potential tourism for the town?  RSP needs to produce clear evidence on this. At the Open Floor hearing in March, we heard evidence from one tourism-dependent business – Albion House – as to the likely loss of business that would result from Ramsgate being under the flightpath day and night of a cargo airport. It is not acceptable for RSP to say that it has taken this into account in the ES. There simply is no evidence that it has done so. RSP needs to present fact-based calculations of the inevitable harm that the noise, air pollution and heavy HGV traffic associated with its proposal would have on the increasingly successful tourist industry in the local area.

SE.2.14	Thanet DC	Tourism  You note in your LIR [REP3-010] that the proposal may adversely affect tourism in Ramsgate.  Do you consider the proposal would have other effects, positive or negative, on the tourism industry in the
		It would have an impact on nearby villages and on local natural areas. It would also have an impact in the Canterbury area. As an example, tourism in Herne Bay is increasing. The town has large areas of quiet open space and tranquillity. When the airport was operational, intermittent overflights by cargo planes would make people who were on the beach, on the Downs or at Reculver look up to see what could be the cause of the noise. Given the typically quiet noise level in these areas, a cargo plane going over has a disproportionate effect and is intrusive. It spoils the peace and quiet that visitors have come to the town to enjoy.
		In addition, we have provided evidence that people as far west of the airport as Hampton in Herne Bay were woken by night flights into Manston when the airport was operational. This kind of disturbance in this era of readily available online information about tourist destinations would mean that potential visitors would simply choose to stay away in their droves.

Responses due by **Deadline 6**: 3 May 2019

#### Appendix One – planning permission approval for St Mildred's Road, Ramsgate – Ns 2.12

#### F/ TH/ 09/0368

#### 60 ST. MILDREDS ROAD, RAMSGATE, CT11 0EF

Erection of a detached 2-storey dwelling following demolition of double garage

#### RECOMMENDATION:

#### APPROVE subject to the following conditions:

1 The development hereby permitted shall be begun before the expiration of three years from the date of this permission.

#### GROUND:

In accordance with Section 91 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended by Section 51 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004).

No development shall take place until the applicant, or their agents or successors in title, has secured the implementation of a watching brief to be undertaken by an archaeologist approved in writing by the Local Planning Authority so that the excavation is observed and items of interest and finds are recorded. The watching brief shall be in accordance with a written programme and specification, which has been submitted to and approved in writing by the Local Planning Authority prior to the commencement of the development.

#### GROUND:

To ensure that features of archaeological interest are properly examined and recorded in accordance with PPG16

3 The development hereby permitted shall be constructed of materials as stated on drawing no. 1364-006-001.

#### GROUND:

In the interests of visual amenity in accordance with Policy D1 of the Thanet Local Plan.

4 The parking layout as shown on approved drawings shall be in place prior to first occupation of the site ad thereafter maintained.

#### GROUND:

In the interest of highway safety.

Prior to the commencement of works, a scheme for protecting the dwellings hereby permitted from external noise from aircraft, which provides a minimum sound attenuation of 20dB coverage over the frequency range 100-3145 Hz, shall be submitted to and approved in writing by the Local Planning Authority, and such

Responses due by **Deadline 6**: 3 May 2019

#### Appendix Two – Letter from Iceni Projects re Manston Green – Ns 2.12



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Strategic Planning Thanet District Council PO Box 9 Cecil House Margate Kent CT9 1XZ

4th October 2018

Dear Sir/Madam

#### Draft Local Plan (Regulation 19) Consultation - Land at Manston Green, Ramsgate

On behalf of our client, Cogent Land LLP (CL), Iceni Projects is writing in response to Thanet District Council's Draft Local Plan consultation exercise. This submission relates to the land known as Manston Green located to the east and west of Haine Road, Ramsgate (the 'Site').

In order to inform this submission, please also find enclosed a copy of the site location plan attached as appendix A1.

#### a. The Site

By way of background, CL were granted outline planning permission on the 'Site', including details of the access, on 13th July 2016, for the erection of 785 dwellings, highways infrastructure works (including single carriageway link road), primary school, small scale retail unit, community hall and public open space on the land to the east and west of Haine Road (Manston Green) (LPA ref: OL/TH/14/0050).

The 'Site', which is 46.83ha in size is located approximately 1km to the east of Manston Airport. A copy of the site location plan and approved masterplan for the Manston Green development is attached at Appendix A1 and A2 respectively.

In line with Conditions 1 and 2 of the planning consent a Reserved Matters Application, for Phase 1, is in the process of being prepared to confirm details relating to outstanding matters such as layout, scale, appearance of any buildings to be erected and landscaping. This Reserved Matters Application is to be submitted to Thanet District Council in advance of the outline planning consent expiration date on the 13th July 2019.

Under Policy SP13 (Strategic Housing Sites) of the Council's Draft Local Plan, the site has also been allocated as a 'site of strategic importance for delivering the quantity and type and variety of homes required to deliver the Council's preferred strategy'. The site has been included as a strategic housing site within the Draft Local Plan for up to 785 dwellings.

The land is allocated for up to 785 new dwellings at a maximum density of 35 dwellings per hectare net at land known as Manston Green (given that planning permission has been granted on site so this figure has not been included within the Draft Local Plan allocation calculation).

Our services include: delivery | design | engagement | heritage | planning | sustainable development | transport | townscape lceni Projects is the trading name of Iceni Projects Limited. Registered in England No. 05359427

Responses due by **Deadline 6**: 3 May 2019

## Appendix Three – Night flight restrictions at the designated airports 2017-2022 – Impact Assessment – Ns 2.24

Title: Night Flight Restrictions at the Designated Airports, 2017-

2022

Total Net

£-12.18m

Present Value

IA No: DfT00370

RPC Reference No: RPC17-3554(2)-DfT

Lead department or agency: Department for Transport

Other departments or agencies: NA

#### Impact Assessment (IA)

Date: 12/07/17

Stage: Final

Source of intervention: Domestic

Type of measure: Secondary legislation

Contact for enquiries: David Hyde, night.flights@dft.gsi.gov.uk

RPC Opinion: fit-for-purpose

#### Summary: Intervention and Options

**Business Net** 

Present Value

£-10.91m

- (	Cost of Preferred (or more likely) Option				
,	Net cost to business per year (EANDCB in 2014 prices)	One-In, Three-Out	Business Impact Target Status		
	£2.2m	In scope	Qualifying provision		

#### What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?

The biggest issue arising from night flights is the effect of night noise on residents in areas surrounding airports. In particular, the impact this has on the sleeping patterns of individuals. There has been growing evidence on the relationship between exposure to higher levels of aircraft noise at night, sleep disturbance, and adverse health effects. However, there is a need to balance these negative externalities on local residents with the economic benefits that night flights offer to the aviation industry and wider economy, including increased flight choice (allowing passengers to fly when convenient for them and to a wide range of destinations) and next-day deliveries of urgent or perishable products.

Currently there is no market process in place to ensure the benefits of night flights are balanced against the local impacts. Without Government intervention, the existing restrictions at Gatwick, Heathrow and Stansted would end in October 2017, and there could be an unlimited amount of flights operating in the night period. In this case, the Government considers that there would be a failure to protect communities from the noise impacts of night flights.

While at other airports in the UK night noise is managed locally, usually as agreements between the airport and local authorities, under the existing policy and legal framework the Secretary of State has responsibility for setting night flight restrictions at Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted. The Government recently consulted on changes to this framework, which could see night flight restrictions set via other processes in the future. The outcome of that consultation is yet to be determined however and there are no alternatives to Government intervention. Therefore there is currently a rationale for the Government to intervene to address the problem under consideration, namely to strike a balance between the local impacts of night flights and the economic benefits they bring. A 'Do Nothing' option is not an appropriate baseline as it is not feasible for the Government to completely remove all regulation on night flights at the designated airports, reasons for this are given at Section 5.2. The impacts of the proposed policy options are therefore compared against a 'do minimum' option based on a continuation of the current regime.

#### What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?

The environmental objective we have set for these airports is to 'limit or reduce the number of people significantly affected by aircraft noise at night, including through encouraging the use of quieter aircraft, while maintaining the existing benefits of night flights'. Rules on the adoption of operating restrictions, such as the night flight regime, require them to be no more restrictive than is needed to achieve the environmental objectives for that airport. These rules however do not specify the exact restrictions that should be in place at an individual airport or airports and this is a domestic policy decision.

1